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Paolo Silvestri1 
 
Abstract 
With this paper I try to sketch a research agenda on the basis of which humanities and 
social sciences might interact with each other, searching for a human common ground in 
tax issues. To this purpose I shall proceed as follows: (§2) I will sketch two working 
hypotheses showing how and why tax system raises anthropological issues at the 
intersection of Philosophy of law, Politics and Economics; to restrict the field of enquiry, 
I will then analyse, firstly (§2.1), the most common theories of taxation – benefit-cost 
principle and ability-to-pay principle – usually meant as attempts to answer the demand 
for tax justice; and, secondly (§2.2), the issue of freedom in taxation as a problem of 
legal-political and economic obligation. I will then show how the research might gain 
some insight from both (§3.1) the literature on homo reciprocans, and (§3.2) the 
literature on gift-giving, which might allow us to better articulate the demands for 
justice and freedom, as well as to glimpse the human foundations of a new fiscal 
democracy. 
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This little essay is dedicated to a great man, a man who one day gave me a great gift, rekindling 
my hopes for the future. At the time when I received that gift, I immediately felt an immense 
sense of gratitude, and an immediate boost to find ways to be able to pay my debts and honour, at 
my very best, the credit and trust I was given. So, I said: “How could I ever repay you?”; and he 
said: “Paolo, I give you this for what you have already done, and not so that you could give it back, 
but with the hope that one day you could do the same gesture towards someone else”. From him I 
learned the truly human meaning of gift and (positive) debt. 
I sincerely wish to thank prof. Luigi R. Einaudi and prof. Viktor Vanberg for having read a first 
draft of this essay and for their precious comments and suggestions as to future developments of 
the research here sketched. Part of the researches developed in this essay and its final version 
were brought to completion during my stay as External Senior Fellow at Freiburg Institute for 
Advanced Studies (FRIAS), University of Freiburg (Germany), and thanks to the grant “World 
Wide Style II” from the University of Torino. A special thanks goes to FRIAS’ Director, prof. Bernd 
Kortmann, the Managing director, Carsten Dose, and FRIAS’ staff, for their constant care and 
support. I benefited a lot from FRIAS’ interdisciplinary intellectual environment, and I sincerely 
wish to thank all those with whom I had the chance to share and discuss some of my research 
ideas: first of all, prof. Lars Feld, but also professors: Günter Schulze, Guilherme Assis de Almeida, 
Joseph J. Capuno, Kristen R. Ghodsee, Judith Schlehe, Catherine Rigby, Francisco Arenas-Dolz, 
Agus Suwignyo. 
I’m well aware that for every single issue touched on in this paper there is an immense literature 
that I barely quote and, perhaps, even ignore. Nevertheless, I would like to consider this paper as 
a first attempt to sketch an anthropological, or simply ‘human’ unitary framework which I believe 
to be at the intersection of many ‘human’ sciences (of course, any critique is always very 
welcome). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction.  
The way in which fiscal institutions and fiscal policies are conceived and 
implemented raises problems at the intersection of so many ethical, institutional, legal, 
political and philosophical issues, both practical and theoretical, that a unified 
framework of all these rather fragmented issues seems to be quite impossible. Let us 
consider just a few of these issues. The performance of fiscal institutions is crucial for its 
effects on equality, inclusiveness and social mobility. Tax issues, or, rather, tax injustices 
are at the core, if not the origin of modern democratic and legal-political (and not only 
economic) institutions. The arrangement of fiscal institutions touches salient political-
social issues, many of them at the heart of a sound and democratic good governance 
both at local and global level: transparency, accountability, efficacy, legitimacy, and 
trust. Last but not least, taxation is ambivalently connected to citizens’ trust/distrust 
relationships: among themselves as well as toward political, legal, and administrative 
institutions, since taxation is often perceived as the most immediate presence (for better 
or for worse) of such institutions in their lives. 
To complicate the picture, the European economic crisis, the restrictive fiscal 
policies and their social consequences have done nothing but to sharpen the citizen’s 
distrust in such legal-political institutions, increased their resentments, and even 
undermined the very possibility of a democratic discussion on taxes1. This is due to many 
reasons.  
First of all, the economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have given a final blow 
to the long crisis and transformation of the welfare state, destabilizing its very 
foundations: with the looming burden left from earlier generations (and politicians) and 
the risk (a certainty, in some cases) of a ‘lost generation’, the foundational ideas of 
distributive justice and intra- and intergenerational mobility, including equal chances for 
new generations, have proved to be highly problematic, especially where the so called 
‘politics of redistribution’ and ‘solidarity’ turned out to be ‘politics of taking’. All in all, 
the crisis has increased the perception of social inequalities, the sense of vulnerability of 
the weak, the resentment and / or envy of the ‘young’ who have not had their ‘fair’ share 
of the cake, and compromised the social bond. 
Moreover, fiscal rules, budgetary disciplines and related fiscal policies – often 
implemented in the name of the much-debated ‘austerity’ or for ‘reasons of revenue’ 
rather than in the name of some idea of justice – have appeared to many as a mere 
external imposition made by European and/or international institutions of dubious 
democratic legitimacy (such as the so-called ‘Troika’), with all due respect for the 
principle “no taxation without representation” and the sovereignty of the citizen, re-
awakening, inter alia, the issue of the democratic deficit of the European Union, as well 
as the issue of the status of the European citizenship.  
These problems call for new and urgent answers to some classic questions, at the 
intersection of many disciplines: why to pay (or not to pay) taxes? Namely, what is the 
foundation of tax obligation, power to tax and fiscal policies? What are the humane 
values – property, freedom, autonomy, free consent, equality, justice, social justice, 
efficiency, benefit and/or ability to pay principle, human dignity, etc., or a certain 
balance of them – that should found, legitimize and guide the analysis, development and 
implementation of a sound fiscal system? If the principle “no taxation without 
representation” appears to be a kind of unfinished revolution, how are the human 
foundations of a new fiscal democracy to be re-thought after the crisis? 
Without claiming to solve such (rather fragmented) puzzles that have challenged 
philosophers, legal and political scholars and economists for centuries2, I would like to 
adopt an anthropological perspective that might help us, if not to re-compose such 
puzzle, at least, hopefully, to focus on that which might constitute its centre: namely, the 
human.  
My aim is to sketch a research agenda – through a series of scattered thoughts 
susceptible of further enquiries and, of course, critiques – on the basis of which 
humanities and social sciences – at least Anthropology, Philosophy of law, Political 
philosophy, Economics and, of course, Public Economics – might interact with each 
other fruitfully, searching for a human common ground in tax issues. 
To this purpose I shall proceed as follows: (§2) I will sketch two working hypotheses 
showing how and why tax system raises anthropological issues at the intersection of 
Philosophy of law, Politics and Economics; to restrict the field of enquiry, I will then 
analyse, firstly (§2.1), the most common theories of taxation – benefit-cost principle and 
ability-to-pay principle – usually meant as attempts to answer the demand for tax justice; 
and, secondly (§2.2), the issue of freedom in taxation as a problem of legal-political and 
economic obligation. I will then show how the research might gain some insight from 
both (§3.1) the literature on homo reciprocans, and (§3.2) the literature on gift-giving, 
which might allow us to better articulate the demands for justice and freedom, as well as 
to glimpse the human foundations of a new fiscal democracy. 
2. An anthropological issue at the intersection of Philosophy of law, Politics and 
Economics 
An extensive research agenda with an anthropological focus should keep in mind 
two working hypotheses: 
A) that the tax system is a focal point of the social contract, at the intersection 
between horizontal and vertical social relationships – among citizens, and between 
citizens and legal-political institutions – and, therefore, a vantage point for a reflection 
on the anthropological foundations of virtuous/vicious circles of good/bad societies and 
good/bad governance.  
B) that it is not possible to find a suitable answer to the problem of the trade-off 
between the human values that should found the legitimacy of a sound fiscal system, 
without a minimal and shareable vision of the human, and that an economy without 
human foundation is literally inhuman and dehumanizing.  
The problem, of course, arises as soon as we try to define what is human, to the 
point that the only thing that seems to be shared is just the idea that it is impossible to 
find a unitary conception of the human. A symptom of this is the fragmentation of the 
ideal-types of the human in the various social sciences: homo oeconomicus, politicus, 
juridicus, etc.3 
This difficulty does not mean that such a broad research agenda is not worth trying. 
In order, for example, to keep a focus on the human, the research might be subdivided 
into three steps: 
1) broad survey on philosophical, ethical, economic, political, legal arguments (pros 
and cons) about tax obligation, power to tax, fiscal policies, and their strong or weak 
relationship to conceptions of human;  
2) search for a ‘human common ground’ through an analysis of identities and 
differences between thinkers/schools whom, starting from a conception of the human, 
have advocated such arguments;4  
3) narrowing the research to humane, people-oriented and sharable solutions for 
the re-building of a trustworthy and sustainable fiscal democracy. 
Even so, such a research agenda still remains too extensive, and an entire life might 
not be enough to bring it to completion.  
Perhaps the best way to further narrow down the field of enquiry is to start right 
from the ‘beginning’, i.e. to address two issues which are particularly controversial and 
often mentioned at the beginning of each economic, legal or political work on theories of 
taxation, and then show how these issues may be reinterpreted through anthropological 
lens. 
2.1. Tax Justice, or ‘just distribution’ of tax burden 
The many theories or principles of taxation elaborated by economists have been 
trying to search for a criterion of justice or equity in taxation, and are usually meant as 
an attempt to answer to the question: how to share or distribute the tax burden?. 
Nevertheless, a satisfying criterion of justice is still to be found.  
Very briefly, the main theories or principles of taxation can be roughly summarized 
as follows:  
1) Benefit principle and/or cost of the service principle. The benefit principle implies 
that the state should levy taxes on individuals in proportion to the benefit they receive 
from public services (those who benefit more from government expenditure should pay 
more taxes to support such expenditure). It also implies that the individual is (ideally) 
free to choose among the services provided by the state. Many criticisms have been 
levelled against such principle. Among them: in most of the cases taxation is and remain 
a form of coercion or compulsory contribution; as the expenditure is incurred by the 
state for the general benefit of its citizens, it is not possible to estimate accurately the 
benefit enjoyed by an individual and/or calculate exactly the quid pro quo; since the poor 
benefit more from public services, they will also have to pay the heaviest taxes, unless we 
decide to exclude them from the benefit of public services (since they do not have money 
for paying such services).  
The Cost of Service principle shifts the emphasis from the benefit received to the 
actual cost of the service the individual should pay (from which he/she would anyway 
enjoy a benefit). It is usually applied in those cases where cost of services are more 
‘easily’ determinable through the mechanism of prices (postal and railway services, 
electricity, etc.). Nevertheless, the difficulty of determining the cost for each individual 
of most of the services provided by the state (police, armed forces, judiciary, etc.) still 
remains.  
In any case, the well-known characteristics of public goods – non-excludability and 
non-rivalry – together with the issue of the free rider are considered serious limits to any 
attempt to conceive the distribution of tax burden in terms of benefit-cost analyses.  
2) The ability-to-pay principle. It is usually held the most commonly accepted 
principle of tax justice, and in many countries it is explicitly or implicitly (via the 
principle of equality or solidarity) recognised as a constitutional principle. It claims that 
individuals should pay taxes in proportion to their ability to pay, measured on the basis 
of the ‘taxable capacity’ of an individual (those who have a higher taxable capacity 
should pay more). Nevertheless, criticisms of the ability to pay principle are not few: 
from the difficulty to find a unanimous definition of the ‘ability to pay’ to the issue of 
whether this ability to pay is to be considered a ‘sacrifice’, and, if so, how to measure 
such sacrifice (not to mention the issue of interpersonal comparison of individual 
utilities), all the way to what should be considered the ‘right’ taxable base and its exact 
measure: ownership of property, expenditures, income, or a certain mixture of them.  
Usually income has been held the best test for such a measure, as well as the best 
taxable basis in order to apply a certain criterion of progressive taxation. As if it were not 
enough, some scholars maintain that progressive taxation, considered to be the 
expression of vertical equity (“unequal treatment of unequals”) is to be integrated with 
horizontal equity (“equal treatment of equals”),5 re-proposing new and better ways of 
measuring such a horizontal equity;6 but others claims that the proportional taxation is 
the only acceptable criterion, not only because those who have more already pay (in 
proportion) more, but also to avoid to discourage those willing to work hard and 
produce more. In this regard, it is not surprising that the flat-tax rate has been claimed 
as the fairest tax of all.7 
The ability-to-pay principle seems to find a shareable meaning only when it is 
interpreted as guarantee or limits against the power to tax, at least in the sense that 
those who do not have an ability to pay cannot be obliged to pay taxes and must be 
exempt from taxation. 
Perhaps this is not surprising because, even if we had found an agreeable and 
shareable notion of tax justice and a correlated criterion to distribute tax burden, the 
issue of taxation as a form of coercion and the question “why (not) to pay taxes?” still 
remains open, usually calling for a justification of the power to tax. This is also the 
reason why some scholars consider the issue of freedom against tax-coercion prior to 
that of justice. 
2.2. Freedom and Taxes: the issue of legal-political and economic obligation 
The question of why pay taxes should not be unknown to legal and political 
philosophers as it resembles the problem of the legal-political obligation: why obey the 
law?8 However, here the difference is that the duty to pay taxes is an obligation that is 
extinguished by a payment, thus adding to the legal-political obligation also an 
economic obligation. 
Although in past times the issue of taxation was typically faced in terms of why obey 
the power to tax and if and how it is to be justified (especially because of the 
arbitrariness of such power), legal-political philosophers9 have left the issue of taxation 
as a form of coercion in the hands of economists. This is perhaps due to the fact that the 
subjective value theory allowed to treat taxes as prices, and the relationship between 
taxpayers and state as “voluntary exchange”.10 
In this respect, it is worth noting that the paradigm of the voluntary exchange and 
the possibility of treating taxes as prices have not changed the contractarian approach 
(and the anthropological assumptions) implied by the cost/benefit principle,11 for the 
exchange is conceived as a sort of do ut des, quid pro quo or synallagmatic or reciprocal 
perfomances between citizen-taxpayer and the state.12 In my view this is also due to the 
fact that in the paradigm of the voluntary exchange both the will and the exchange have 
often been assumed as a figure (and guarantee) of freedom. 
This notwithstanding, if the problem of the legitimacy of taxation as coercion is 
posed in terms of ‘voluntary vs coercion’, or freedom vs coercion, the maximum that one 
can ask it is to minimize coercion and maximize possibilities for voluntary exchanges, 
and / or minimize the role and size of government and leave as much room as possible to 
the private sector. 
3. The promises of the Gift: Freedom and justice. Searching for a new fiscal 
democracy. 
An anthropological re-reading of the aforementioned issues and controversies will 
help us to better understand and perhaps overcome their limits, to re-read more 
carefully the past, and have some little hope for the future. 
3.1. Anthropology of taxation and homo reciprocans 
In this regard, I think it would be important to re-start from (and further develop) 
the intuitions and reflections of one of the greatest representatives of the Italian 
tradition in Public Finance, Luigi Einaudi, especially his Myths and paradoxes of justice in 
taxation, where the significance of the last two chapters, added in the second editon 
(1940), is still to be assessed and weighted up13. Moving from the limits of the voluntary 
exchange (as economic) approach to taxation, he ends up facing the inescapable 
question of the legitimacy of the power to tax, within the context of a wider and longer 
reflection on invisible foundations of a good/bad society and good/bad government14.  
For our purposes it is worth mentioning the following points of his reflection, each 
of which is susceptible of further enquiries and researches: 1) through a reformulation of 
the theories of the élites and legitimacy15 Einaudi understand how the so called tax-
coercion would not be necessarily perceived as a brute coercion if power (and the power 
to tax) is founded on shared and recognized values and on a shared sense of reciprocal 
trust, or, as he calls it, on an atmosphere of “compromise and mutual recognition”, first 
of all between majority and minority. Significant, in this regard, is his critique of 
Wicksell.16 In other words, he refers to the cultural-moral foundations and resources of 
trust/distrust (or what is today called the “social capital”) on which any society is 
founded, and through which societies are used to overcome “social dilemmas” such as 
that of the public goods and of the free-rider; 2) to better understand the fiscal 
phenomenon, Einaudi studies it through a historical-anthropological research, almost 
ethnographic, or, as it were, following the principle ubi homo, ibi societas; ubi societas, 
ibi jus; ergo ubi homo, ibi jus ... and ubi homo, ubi societas and ibi tributum. In this way, 
he detaches tax obligation from any imperativism of his epoch (based on the notion of 
state sovereignty), in order to understand such obligation within the framework of the 
always problematic anthropological tension between law and freedom, institutional and 
individual; 3) by doing so, he discovers, through a thorough analysis of the public finance 
of Periclean Polis (as a historical example of good society), the existence of liturgyes, that 
is, “spontaneous oblations” or “voluntary donations” or fiscal gifts to the res publica; 4) 
The fiscal gift is here a fundamental figure of free and non-constrained contribution that 
goes beyond the mere costs-benefits calculus of the individual tax burden, of which, 
nevertheless, Einaudi highlights its potential for the social bond and, at the same time, 
its structural fragility and ambiguity, for the gift is always susceptible of being perverted 
into a form of harsh competition17 as well as capable of undermining that same social 
bond; 5) in this way, Einaudi discovers the latent presence in the Periclean polis, as in 
any society, of virtuous and vicious circles – in this case, for example: “ambition” and 
“emulation”, and “fear” and “envy” among those who perform such liturgies (mainly the 
rich), and between them and other citizens. Such virtuous/vicious circles, mainly 
depending on societal and political (horizontal and vertical) relations of reciprocity, are 
at the core of an “extremely delicate” social equilibrium, where the tax system plays an 
important role in distributing burdens and benefits among citizens, since the tax system 
is “the condition, the effect and the sign of a city that had achieved political perfection”;18 
6) this, in turn, led him to the discovery of the theory of the critical point19 as an 
epistemological and anthropological theory of limit and freedom,20 useful to explain the 
ambiguous virtuous/vicious circles founding any society and institution, whose ultimate 
foundation is based, for better or for worse, on human freedom;21 7) The ruling class, 
provided that it is recognised (and rules) in the name of shared values, is a figure of 
thirdness that stands beyond the mere legality or positivity of the law and guarantees the 
equilibrium of the system and its legitimacy, included the legitimacy of taxes.22 
All these insights can also be fruitfully compared to the more recent philosophical, 
social and anthropological literature on trust and institutions23 as well as to the literature 
on tax compliance, tax evasion, behavioral economics and psychology of taxation.24 This 
literature has long demonstrated the difficulty of explaining taxpayers behavior with the 
lens of homo oeconomicus model and cost-benefit calculus25, invoking the necessity of a 
more complex anthropology or a sort of ‘anthropological turn’ in order to better explain 
the tax compliance with new lens, i.e. with the homo reciprocans26 provided with other 
dimensions of behavior such as respect of social norms, voluntary provision of public 
goods, altruism, fairness, charitable donations, group motivations and trust. 
“Trust breeds trust”, as Feld and Frey have argued with reference to “how taxpayers 
are treated” by Tax Authorities,27 also showing the existence of an implicit or 
“psychological tax contract” between citizens and government, which goes well beyond 
the traditional “deterrence model” (which, in my view, can also be understood as an 
economic version of legal imperativism). Interestingly enough, such a contract is not 
meant by citizens as a rigorous equivalence (in terms of do ut des) between paying taxes 
and receiving public goods “as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and 
legitimate”.28 The same might be argued as to the horizontal circulation of trust/distrust 
within society, posing once again the need to better study this kind of virtuous/vicious 
circles. 
This should also lead us to better understand the performative character of any 
discourse on the human, whether it be implied by tax authorities or by scholars. What is 
at stake here is not so much an issue of anthropological pessimism vs anthropological 
optimism, and even less an issue of anthropological ‘realism’ (as if we were looking for 
‘how humans really behave’), for any statement on the human being will model the 
human being, becoming, sooner or later, a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
If “trust breeds trust”, gift breeds gift. The point, as well as the anthropological issue 
at stake here, has been clearly grasped by the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk,29 who has 
recently insisted on both the necessity of an anthropological turn and the need of 
introducing an ethics of the gift in taxation: from a passive citizen, often assumed to be 
as mere debtor towards the state, to an active citizen who gives or donates voluntarily to 
his fellow citizens, without the mediation of the “grasping hand” of the state. The 
interesting aspect of this approach is that it is envisaged also as a way to invert the 
vicious cycle of the economic crisis, the growing resentment about taxation and rising 
state debt, and to make citizens more conscious about the obligations we owe to each 
other as well as about the destinations of their taxes that often end up into the black hole 
of state budget, without knowing how such funds are then redistributed (if not wasted or 
stolen).  
Sloterdijk’s thought is not entirely new and not only a thought experiment, as we 
have seen with the historical cases of fiscal gift analysed by Einaudi, nevertheless 
realizing a society entirely based on voluntary contributions is full of practical and 
technical obstacles that cannot be hidden.30 This notwithstanding, it should not prevent 
us from trying some kind of practical experiment aimed at gradually expanding the share 
of such fiscal gifts and put them under the control of donors.31  
Perhaps, and in some respects, we do not even need to imagine a society entirely 
based on voluntary contributions, if by ‘voluntary’ we imply a notion of ‘free will’ as 
opposed to any kind of obligation. Rather, what we need is a better understanding of the 
kind of freedom and justice implied by reciprocity in human relations. And, so far, only 
the literature and (much more than the literature) the practice of the gift-giving 
promises the possibility of a balanced articulation of the demands for freedom and 
justice, however precarious it may be. 
3.2. Freedom and Justice in taxation 
It is precisely on this point that the literature on gift-giving32 can help us to escape 
from the doldrums of the aforementioned discussions on both principles of justice in 
taxation (benefit and / or ability to pay principle) and freedom from taxation. 
Such discussions, in fact, closely resemble the problem, widely discussed in the 
literature on gift-giving, of the relationship between interest and gratuity. The problem, 
indeed, exists in so far as interest and gratuity are conceived dichotomically, that is 
isolating and opposing interest in receiving and gratuity of giving, or a purely utilitarian 
exchange and a purely gratuitous gift.33 
The question is obviously controversial, but, with reference to the aforementioned 
discussions on the theories of taxation, it is revealing that the conceptual and legal 
distinction between taxes and other levies (such as fees, contributions, etc.) – existing in 
many countries, but with different nuances – resembles this way of posing the problem: 
levies “are paid in change of something received by the taxpayer while taxes are paid 
without anything in return”.34 Usually such a distinction between taxes and (other) levies 
parallels also the distinction between benefit-cost principle and ability-to-pay principle.35  
Instead, if we assume a conception of the gift as, for example, that proposed by 
Caillé and Godbout:  
we define as a gift every lending of goods or services effected, without guarantee of 
restitution, towards the end of creating, nourishing or re-creating the social bond 
between the people involved,36  
and stress the words “without guarantee of restitution”, the perspective changes: we 
can legitimately expect something in return, even though this return is not guaranteed. 
The issue at the heart of the phenomenon of the gift turned out to be not so much 
gratuity, but freedom, and, on the other hand, “freedom and non-guarantee are two sides 
of the same phenomenon”.37 
If there is indeed something that the literature on gift-giving has taught us is the 
fact that the gift conjugates obligation and freedom of each person involved in the 
circulation of the gift. The ‘only’ true (and anthropological) question, is the free 
recognition (or non-recognition) of the obligation or debt, in the sense that human 
freedom is asserted as such at the very moment in which it recognizes (or not) his debt.  
Obligation and freedom remain in a constitutive tension that cannot be resolved 
theoretically, because both freedom and obligation depend on the concrete experience of 
life and living together, and they can also give rise, once again, to virtuous or vicious 
circles, or, as Godbout calls them, “negative” (or “positive”) “reciprocal debts”, occurring 
when the individual is convinced to give more (or less) than he/she receives. The 
situation characterized by negative reciprocal debts slides easily into a spiral of 
reciprocal recriminations and accusations about who did or gave more or less. Instead, 
the situation of positive reciprocal debts turns on a desire to give back and further feeds 
the cycle of giving. It is only the latter case that triggers a virtuous circle in which 
everyone has something to ‘gain’, fuelling further mutual trust and social ties: “trust 
arises and remains in a situation where everyone wins”.38 
And this brings us back, ultimately, to the limits of how to set the issue of tax justice 
in terms of just distribution of the tax burden: gift implies a different idea of justice. 
On closer inspection the differences between benefit principle and ability-to-pay 
principle are not as great, since both principles remain within an idea of distributive 
justice understood as proportion. One might argue that the difference between the two 
principles lies in the degree of proportion. On the other hand, both principles find 
serious limits in determining accurately the benefits enjoyed by or the sacrifices required 
to taxpayers. Maybe we should stop with this accountancy of giving and taking. 
As Sloterdijk claims (though not thinking about the aforementioned debates on tax 
justice, but implicitly referring to the literature on gift), gift-giving inevitably implies a 
incalculable surplus and asymmetry: 
in every authentic exchange between human beings the advantage of giving 
is unbridgeable. Justice can only be thought beyond the symmetry between 
giving and taking. It can never be imagined without injustice and 
unilateralism. Consequently, the act of ‘responding’ can never end up in the 
equal return of a gift received. The ‘right answer’ can only be a further giving, 
with which an asymmetrical relationship is established again39. 
Despite its fragility and precariousness, the gift is one of the most powerful and 
sustainable ‘renewable energy’. Rethinking the social bond starting from gift,40 in this 
case the fiscal gift, may involve the sustainability of a new fiscal democracy.  
And this may also lead us to have hopes for the future, given also the intrinsic link 
between gift-giving and hope.41 It’s time to reverse the current ‘depressive’ economy into 
an economy of ‘hope’. But this cannot but depend on us, and on our freedom. Who is 
expected to invert the vicious circle? 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 In this regard one of the major stakes in tax issues and fiscal policies, was well 
summarized years ago by Musgrave: “[it is not surprising and indeed appropriate that 
fiscal policy] should be among the most controversial of policy issues. The fiscal process, 
as much as any other democratic institution, occupies the middle ground between 
anarchy and absolute rule. It provides the forum on which interest groups and ideologies 
may clash without resort to the barricades and on which compromise and cooperation 
may be sought” (Musgrave, 1981). Nevertheless, it is quite amazing what we have seen in 
these years of crisis: a kind of repression of history or a “skeptical or nihilistic” attitude 
towards questions of tax justice, thus forgetting “how many ferocious seditions and 
bloody riots have erupted in the past centuries, in every European country, as a reaction 
to tax injustice” (Falsitta, 2008: IXX). 
 
2 Only to quote some recent attempts to find a unitary philosophical framework for tax 
issues, see McGee (2004), Murphy, Nagel (2002), Halliday (2013), Gaisbauer, Schweiger, 
Sedmak (2015). 
 
3 The problem of “homo oeconomicus vs homo politicus” is at the intersection of several 
social sciences and is still extensively debated today; see, for example, the monographic 
number of Public choice (137), especially Brennan (2008), Buchanan (2008) Milgate, 
Stimson (2008); as to homo juridicus see Supiot (2006). 
 
4 This would imply to explore, ranging from libertarian to egalitarian approaches, the 
different perspectives claimed by: Mises (1949), Hayek (1960, 1973), Brennan, Buchanan 
([1980] 2000), Buchanan (1967 [1999]), Nozick (1974), Epstein (1986), Salin (1996), Rawls 
(1972) – also in comparison to the works of Harsanyi (1975) and Binmore (2005) (see 
Holler, Leroch (2014)) – Dworkin (2000, 2006), Holmes, Sunstein (1999), all the way to 
the “libertarianism without inequality” proposed by Otsuka (2003), Ostrom, for her 
works on governing the commons, institutions, trust and reciprocity (1990, 2003, 2010), 
but also Sen (1999, 2009) Nussbaum (2011) with reference to their capabilities approach. 
                                                                                                                                               
From an anthropological point of view, Dworkin’s perspective is significant, if only 
because it is conceived as search for a ‘common ground’ for opposing ideologies (though 
geographically limited to legal-political debates in the US) based on the notion of 
‘human dignity’ – articulated in terms of Liberty and Equality – applicable also to tax 
issues and debates (Dworkin, 2006). For a good introduction (with further 
bibliographical references) to egalitarian and libertarian perspectives in the Anglo-
American political philosophy see Kimlika (2002: 53-165). 
 
5 On the Musgrave-Kaplow debate see Repetti, McDaniel (1993). 
 
6 Auerbach, Assett (2002). 
 
7  Hall, Rabushka (1995). For a critical survey on proportional taxation and its advocates 
see Fried (1999). 
 
8 For a recent reappraisal of this issue, with specific reference to the legal 
conventionalism and its limits, see Schiavello (2010). 
 
9 Though the issue of legitimacy and authority of law was exemplified by Kelsen just by 
recurring to the famous issue: how to distinguish the command of an income-tax official 
from that of a gangster (Kelsen 1967, 8), to my knowledge the issue of taxation in terms 
of legal-political obligation as been studied more by scholars of tax law or by 
constitutionalists rather than by legal philosophers. 
 
10 Musgrave (1939), and, in a legal perspective, Vanoni (1932). 
 
11 It is also worth noting that even the ability-to-pay principle can be reduced to a 
contractarian approach, for example if we consider the ability to pay as a measure of the 
benefit received by the public services, see Griziotti (1949). On the difficulty of 
separating rigorously the benefit principle from the ability-to-pay see Giardina (1961). 
 
12 Francesco Forte (“The social pact-contractarian approach to taxes as prices of public 
services”; Paper presented at the Conference of International Atlantic Economic Society 
(Milan, March, 13, 2015, not published)) has recently summarized this longstanding 
contractarian tradition as follows: “The social pact-contractarian approach to taxes as 
prices of public services appeared with the anti-Hobbesian theory of social contract 
contractualism based on natural laws relating to individual rights of property, health and 
liberty of Samuel Pufendorf (1668) and of John Locke (1690). In the Hume approach, the 
evolutionary aspect of the pact as reciprocity behaviour is evidenced. Adam Smith’s 
approach to taxation in Wealth of Nations (1773) adopts the contractarian theory of taxes 
in the interaction between supply and demand in an ambiguous way, the benefit 
principle being mixed with the ability to pay principle. Alexis De Toqueville (Democracy 
in America) links the tax-public expenditure relationship to the democratic system 
under the majority principle with redistribution limited by mutual interest and other 
factors. The first theoretical formulation in terms of marginal utility of taxes equalized 
with that of public services, by the Austrian economists Sax and von Wieser, overlooks 
participation of individuals in choices both in the formation and application of rules. The 
task of considering the interaction between government structure and individuals and 
market economy structure was undertaken by the marginalist Italian schools of Ferrara, 
                                                                                                                                               
Ricca Salerno, Mazzola, De Viti De Marco, Pantaleoni, Einaudi and by the Griziotti and 
Vanoni Law and Economics School. The Swedish School of Wicksell and Lindhal 
developed the public process by individuals through the voting system. James Buchanan 
and Gordon Tullock building on Italian and Wicksellian tradition developed a two-level 
public choice system at the constitutional and post-constitutional level with a dual 
Italian model without exploitation and with exploitation. However, they differ because 
Buchanan’s approach includes ethical elements as in the natural law tradition, while 
Tullock’s approach is strictly utilitarian. Alan Peacock’s approach emphasizes the 
importance of the supply side aspect inherent to government as an organization and to 
politicians as entrepreneurs.  In the Coasian Law and Economics approach, the 
fruitfulness of a private law approach is evidenced. Feld and Frey follow a parallel line in 
their paradigm of the implicit psychological social contract.  Alm explains that tax 
compliance is more often much greater than that explicable thorough deterrence of tax 
enforcement policy via group motivation. In experimental economics research, such as 
that of Burlando and Hey, the existence of an implicit social fiscal contract emerges with 
varying results, under altruism, cooperation and reciprocity hypotheses, with 
accompanying factors dealt with through development of the public choice approach”. 
 
13 Though Luigi Einaudi’s works in public finance is widely known among scholars, in the 
following analysis I will be referring to Einaudi’s Myths and paradoxes of justice in 
taxation (1940) that has only recently (and only partially) been translated into English 
(2014 [1940]), and in particular to the last two chapters, which were the fruit of the 
debate with his pupil Fasiani (Fossati, Silvestri, 2012) and the subject of further thoughts 
in an unpublished essay (Einaudi, 2015). 
 
14 See Silvestri (2008, 2012a, 2012c), and the essays included in Heritier, Silvestri (2012). 
 
15 Forte, Silvestri (2013). 
 
16 Through the mechanism of consent and democratic vote, Wicksell tried to overcome 
one of the major limits of the benefit principle (the difficulty to know or measure the 
benefit received by the individual, and the preference revelation problem), and, at the 
same time, the issue of coercion, being the decision on tax policies the expression of a 
free consent (through complicated mechanism of democratic vote and unanimity rules). 
Though ideally endorsing Wicksell’s thought, Einaudi pointed out that the consent is the 
precondition of the democratic vote and not its result, otherwise the decision of the 
majority would never be recognised by the minority. 
 
17 The issue is known since Mauss’ ground-breaking work (Mauss 1990 [1923-24]), but see 
also Starobinski (1995 [1994]). 
 
18 “The city reached its crowning glory not because of the way it conducted its financial 
affairs, but because Periclean finances were at one and the same time the condition, the 
effect and the sign of a city that had achieved political perfection” (Einaudi, 2006 [1940]: 
127). 
 
19 Further developed in Einaudi (1949). 
 
20 Silvestri (2012a: 89-91); Heritier (2012). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
21 See Anspach (2007). 
 
22 As Einaudi (2014 [1940]: 147) writes, concluding his Myths and paradoxes of justice in 
taxation, “any ruler is perfectly capable of coercing people into paying taxes. But the 
leader chosen by the valentior pars of the citizens […] intends to elevate the mortals of 
the earthly city to the divine city, where the word ‘tax’ is uknown, because all the people 
understand the value of the sacrifice offered on the altar of the common good”. 
 
23 See Luhmann (1979), Douglas (1986), Gambetta (1988). 
 
24 See Allingham, Sandmo (1972); Alm, McClelland, Schulze (1992); Alm  (2014); Torgler 
(2007); Androni, Enrard, Feinstein (1988); Cullis, Lewis (1997); Feld, Frey (2000); Cox 
(2012). 
 
25 More generally, for a fundamental critique of the limits of the rational choice theory 
and an integration of it in terms of rule following behaviour see Vanberg (1994). 
 
26 See also Bruni (2010). 
 
27 Feld, Frey (2000). 
 
28 Feld, Frey (2007). In this regard, it would never be enough to reflect on the words of a 
representative of the Movement “Vedove della crisi” [“Recession Widows” or “Widow of 
the crisis”], a movement created in the wake of a series of suicides – mainly due to the 
economic crisis, the growing indebtedness and/or the impossibility of paying tax debt –, 
and triggered, in particular, by the tragic act of a man who, fallen in desperation for not 
being able to pay his tax debt, set fire to himself outside the tax office. The 
representative, speaking also in the name of the widow of this man, said: “We are not 
here to say that one doesn’t have to pay taxes, because they have to be paid, it’s a duty. 
We are here to seek a human relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities” 
(“Widows of the crisis”, Public demonstration, Bologna, May 4, 2012, italics mine).  
 
29 Sloterdijk (2010). Sloterdijk’s articles raised a hot debate. Among the critical responses 
see Honneth (2010), and Zizek (2012).  
 
30 Rothbard (2004: 199 ff). To my knowledge, the only theoretical attempt to conceive 
voluntary taxation, moving from a contractualist approach, is Sugden (1990). 
 
31 For example, as suggested by Carrico (2013) in his review of Sloterdijk’s work, “while 
taxation should remain mandatory, ballots might be affixed to personal tax returns, so 
that taxpayers can decide where their funds, or rather their gifts, will be allocated. The 
results of these ballots, maintaining compulsory taxation yet incorporating philanthropic 
input, will then determine the federal budget for the next fiscal year”. 
Another example is that of the “percentage legislation” or “percentage philanthropy”, see 
Bullain (2004). It defines the mechanism by which taxpayers can freely designate a 
certain percentage of their income tax paid to churches, a specific non-profit, non-
governmental organization (NGO) or entities whose main activity is of public interest. In 
Italy such a mechanism of ‘voluntary’ contributions, originally thought for churches 
                                                                                                                                               
(0,8%), has been enlarged to many other entities (0,5%, also known as “five per 
thousand”), with a huge success. Though it can be questionable whether such a 
mechanism represent a form of gift (since it remains within a statual-coercive 
framework, but the issue, of course, is open to further enquiries), an expansion of this 
very modest rate would be desirable anyway, at least to reach a more significant 
threshold, thanks to which the fiscal gift enters into a virtuous circle, as well as to 
enlarge the citizen sovereignty and his choice in fiscal issues. Not by chance, this 
mechanism has been seen as a truly form of fiscal democracy at least in terms of fiscal 
subsidiarity and fiscal sovereignty of the taxpayer, see the essays included in the report 
edited by Montedoro, Marucci (2012). 
 
32 For a recent reappraisal of the relevance of the gift in a legal-aesthetic and 
philosophical perspective see Heritier (2014). For an attempt to reintroduce the gift into 
the economic discourse and against Economics imperialism see Cedrini, Marchionatti 
(2013). 
 
33 For a reassesment of this issue, against the idealization of the gift as absence of any 
personal interest and return see Sequeri (1999) who also insists on the affective and 
relational dimension of the gift. For a re-reading of Sequeri’s thought and his 
“anthropology of justice” see the monographic number of this Journal 7/2013. For an 
appraisal of Sequeri’s thought in terms of “affective turn” see, ivi, Heritier (2013). 
 
34 Barassi (2005). 
 
35 Here, once again, the issue is open as to whether one can equate ‘taxes’ and the 
‘redistribution’ of the welfare state to a modern system of circulation of the gift (as 
Mauss and Titmuss thought), or if the coercion of taxation is incompatible with any idea 
of gift, with the further aggravating circumstance that the institutionalized 
redistribution perverts the very idea of gift, as claimed by Godbout (2002: 68-85). 
 
36 Godbout (2002: 30). 
 
37 Godbout (1998: 80). 
 
38 Caillé (1998: 107). 
 
39 Sloterdijk (2010: 86 (transl. mine)). 
 
40 Pulcini (2001). 
 
41 Miyazaki (2004). 
